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Executive Summary
Despite their notable differences, Brazil and Turkey have 
been widely compared as emerging economic powers led 
by popular governments in the 2000s. These comparisons 
have largely ignored the parallel institutional evolution of 
their civil service since the early 20th century. Throughout 
the past century, the two countries experienced simul-
taneous attempts to reform and modernise their public 
administrations mostly in the Weberian model. From the 
1980s onwards, their paths diverged: Brazil after re-demo-
cratisation reinforced the central, merit-based structure of 
its civil service, while Turkey introduced new private sec-
tor arrangements and practices. 
Although today both civil services boast a mix of career 
and contract arrangements, they also display different 
structural characteristics, and face opposite sets of chal-
lenges regarding meritocracy, professionalism, efficiency 
and political patronage. While until recently Turkey could 
be viewed as a relatively successful example of economic 
and political liberalisation – including integrating NPM 
principles into the state bureaucracy – the country’s re-
cent decline into authoritarianism and excessive political 
interference in state institutions have turned it into a cau-
tionary tale for Brazil. 
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I. Introduction 
Despite their notable societal, institutional and geopoli-
tical differences, Brazil and Turkey have been compared 
frequently in recent years on economic and political grou-
nds. During the 2000s, both countries were categorised 
as emerging economies, featuring popular governments 
overseeing dynamic GDP growth. The combination of 
strong economic performance and the electoral success 
of the Workers’ Party (PT) and Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) governments drew international praise and 
attention, which in turn translated into increasing confi-
dence for the two governments on the world stage. Since 
2013, the focus of comparisons has turned decidedly less 
upbeat, as both countries have been mired in political and 
economic crises, societal tensions, high level corruption 
cases and concerns of democratic retrenchment. 
Amidst narratives of fast-paced rise and decline, one relati-
vely slow-changing dimension that can reveal much about 
the two countries has gone unexplored: the evolution the 
civil service. This is a story that merits going further back 
in time – to the early 20th century foundations of the mo-
dern state structures in Brazil and Turkey, and consequent 
periods of reform – in order to unearth various similarities 
as well as differences in the structural characteristics of the 
Brazilian and Turkish public administrations today.  
Therefore, the aim of this research is to analyse from a 
comparative perspective the historical evolution and the 
existing legal, institutional, structural and political cha-
racteristics of the Brazilian and Turkish civil services, to-
gether with the major debates and initiatives surrounding 
reforming them. The point of departure is the presence, in 
both cases, of bureaucratic apparatuses established upon 
Weberian principles (professional and career-based with 
centralised recruitment systems) which, in the past two to 
three decades, have been pushed (by diverse actors and 
varying intensities) towards adopting more flexible, effi-
ciency-driven and performance-based arrangements, ge-
nerally associated with market liberalisation and the New 
Public Management (NPM) approach.  
The two-case comparative approach used in this research 
enables us to observe salient issues and dynamics that 
may not be detectable through the lens of a single case 
study. In this aspect, the differences between the two ca-
ses – particularly the issues surrounding the Turkish state 
and the civil service, which have gone further down the 
path of market liberalisation since the 1980s than Brazil – 
may serve as a useful reference point in debates regarding 
the future of the civil service in Brazil. 
This report consists of five sections including this Intro-
duction. The following section sets the “Comparative Fra-
mework” of the report, focusing on the macroeconomic 
and institutional-political characteristics, and assesses 
the merits and difficulties of juxtaposing two seemingly 
very different and geographically far-apart countries. The 
third section narrates the “Evolution of the Civil Service in 
Brazil and Turkey” since the turn of the 20th century un-
til the present time, with a focus on simultaneous periods 
of reform, such as under modernising strongmen, Getúlio 
Vargas and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, under military influen-
ce in the 1960s or in the era of re-democratisation and neo-
-liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s. The fourth section 
provides a detailed overview of the “Structure of the Civil 
Service” in the two countries today, touching upon preva-
lent debates and problems. Finally, the fifth section draws 
“Evaluations and Conclusions” from the study. 
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II. Comparative Framework
Brazil is ten times the total size of Turkey and has around 
2.5 times its population. Unlike Turkey, or its predeces-
sor the Ottoman Empire, which have not experienced ex-
tended periods of direct foreign rule, modern Brazil has 
been shaped by its legacy of three-centuries of European 
(Portuguese) colonisation. Consequences of this forma-
tive historical experience are visible in Brazil’s racial and 
cultural diversity as well as its engrained socio-economic 
inequalities. The population of Brazil is largely Christian, 
whereas Turkey is overwhelmingly Muslim. In terms of na-
tural resources, Brazil stands out as a major producer and 
exporter of oil and gas, while Turkey lacks both and is a net 
importer of energy. 
In geopolitical terms, Turkey is situated in one of the more 
unstable and conflict-prone regions of the world, sharing 
long borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria to its east and sou-
theast, with the European Union to the west, and a mari-
time border with Russia to the north. Brazil, in contrast, 
enjoys significantly calmer borders and an overall more 
peaceful regional environment. As a result, it might be ar-
gued that transnational rivalries, conflicts and dynamics 
shape domestic politics of Turkey to a greater extent than 
that of Brazil, as evidenced by Turkey’s long-standing (but 
troubled) accession bid to the European Union, member-
ship in the NATO or its various degrees of involvement in 
the armed conflicts and crises of the Middle East. 
It is indeed indicative that Turkey’s oldest and most violent 
conflict, the 40-year old armed struggle against Kurdish se-
paratists, is truly international in nature, directly involving 
not only neighbouring Iran, Iraq and Syria (which are also 
home to significant Kurdish minorities) but also global 
powers such as Russia, the United States and various Euro-
pean nations, through their military presence in the region 
or as a result of diasporic politics. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two 
countries with high relevance for the subject matter of this 
research is in their systems of government. As a reflection 
of its size and history, Brazil is a federative presidentialism, 
a. Comparing Apples & Oranges?
Before moving on to an analysis of the civil service in Brazil and Turkey, it is necessary to establish a comparative framework 
of the two countries. A perfunctory first look, summarised in Table 1 below, immediately reveals a number of basic differen-
ces rather than the similarities between the two countries, which brings up the question of whether this is a comparison of 
apples and oranges.
Brazil Turkey
Population 207.7 million (2016) 79.5 million (2016)
Urban population 86.2% of total population (2017) 74.4% of total population (2017)
Popular religions Roman Catholic 64.6%, Protestant 22.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni)
Border countries
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, French Guiana, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Gree-
ce, Iran (534km), Iraq (367 km), Syria (899 km)
Political System Federalism Presidentialism
Unitarism 
Parliamentarism*
Freedom House 
2018 Score 78/100 (Free) 32/100 (Not Free)
Table 1 – Comparing Brazil and Turkey
made up of 26 states (plus the federal district) which enjoy 
a certain degree of autonomy in their internal governance. 
In contrast, Turkey is a highly centralised unitary state (the 
most centralised of any country in the OECD, of which it is 
a member) that has been governed under a parliamentary 
system since its foundation in 1923. This difference bears 
its marks on the structure and make-up of their state bu-
reaucracies, which will be discussed below. While Turkey 
continues to retain its excessively centralised structure, its 
political system has been undergoing significant changes 
in recent years, with a referendum in 2017 finalising a con-
troversial transition into an executive hyper-presidentia-
lism, which will be officially inaugurated in 2019
Finally, while during the first decade of the 21st century, 
Brazil and Turkey were widely praised as emerging powers 
featuring democratic politics (often evoked in contrast to 
Venezuela or China in Brazil’s case, and Iran or Russia in 
Turkey’s case), the two countries’ paths have also diverged 
in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the popular 
protests that both Brazil and Turkey experienced in mid-
2013. This is in part because of the dramatic democratic 
backsliding experienced in Turkey under President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian one-man rule. 
In its 2018 report, the Washington, D.C.-based democra-
cy watchdog Freedom House downgraded Turkey for the 
first time from Partly Free to Not Free, stating that it had 
experienced “the most dramatic decline in freedoms” of 
any country globally over the past decade1.  Despite its on-
going political and economic turmoil, which included the 
impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, Brazil 
is still categorised as a Free country and remains by defini-
tion a liberal democracy, albeit a problematic one.
1 “Turkey’s status declined from Partly Free to Not Free, due to a deeply 
flawed constitutional referendum that centralized power in the pre-
sidency, the mass replacement of elected mayors with government 
appointees, arbitrary prosecutions of rights activists and other percei-
ved enemies of the state, and continued purges of state employees, 
all of which have left citizens hesitant to express their views on sensi-
tive topics.” Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, https://free-
domhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 
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b. Macroeconomic Indicators
Over the past decade, comparisons between Brazil and Turkey have largely focused on their macroeconomic performance 
and profile as emerging economic powers, and it is here that we come across a set of similarities and parallel developments. 
Breaking the cycle of high/hyper-inflation2,  economic crises and austerity experienced during the late 1980s and the 90s, 
both countries tamed inflation and went on to boast high growth rates in the first decade of the 2000s. This came on the back 
of increasing foreign direct investment, growing consumer spending, rise in exports, and in the case of Brazil, surging global 
commodity prices (which, conversely, has a dampening effect on energy-poor Turkey’s growth rate).  
Brazil Turkey
GDP 1.796 trillion USD (2016) 857.7 billion USD (2016)
Table 2 – GDP growth
2 Although Turkey grappled with consistently high inflation during the 1990s, with annual CPI change reaching 106% in 1994, its inflationary problems paled 
next to the hyperinflation in Brazil, which neared 3000% in 1990. 
Growth halted abruptly but temporarily in both countries as a consequence of the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, but 
recovered again, before slowing down sharply and more permanently (and in the case of Brazil, entering into a recession) 
due to domestic political and global structural factors after 2012.
 Table 3 – Economic growth
12
As a result of this period of sustained growth, Brazil and Turkey entered the world’s top economies and witnessed various 
improvements in their socio-economic indicators. The Human Development Index rose in both countries. In Turkey, the GDP 
per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP), nearly doubled between 2001 and 2014. In Brazil, millions of citizens 
were lifted from poverty as a result of the government’s extensive social welfare policies. 
These achievements, however, risk being undone in the wake of the turbulent period the two countries have entered in 
recent years. Singling out the two countries, a World Economic Forum report recently noted: “Among the emerging markets 
seen as having great potential in the early 2000s, Brazil and Turkey have now lost much of the ground they gained before 
2013.”3 
Brazil Turkey
GDP rank 8th (nominal) / 8th (PPP) 17th (nominal) / 13th (PPP)
Table 4 – HDI and GDI per capita growth
During the above mentioned period of growth, the role that the state played as an economic actor has differed notably in 
3 World Economic Forum (WEF), The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-re-
port-2017-2018, p. 16. 
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Brazil, where social spending, subsidies and loans to national corporations featured prominently, than in Turkey. As a result, 
both public spending and debt have been higher in Brazil compared to Turkey (Table 5).
This is partly reflective of the ideological orientation of the governing parties that steered the two countries for much of the 
2000s, Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT) being more to the left in economic policy than Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), which on the whole followed a more neo-liberal path.
Table 5 – Government spending and debt
c. Quality of Government and Governance 
Indicators
Perceptions of systemic corruption (both petty and high 
level), bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of trust in public 
institutions and politicians have long been causes of pu-
blic discontent in Brazil and Turkey. Correspondingly, at 
various points in the recent past, the two countries laun-
ched initiatives to stem corruption, increase public trust in 
institutions and enhance efficiency in governance. These 
efforts often followed sustained popular backlash and/or 
international market pressures that came on the back of 
high profile political scandals or economic crises.
Turkey’s financial crisis in 2001-2002 initiated IMF-sponso-
red structural reforms in the country’s banking system and 
macroeconomic policy, and led to a political restructuring 
that brought to power a newly established party, the Isla-
mist-rooted AKP, on the back of promises of eradicating 
corruption, improving economic growth, infrastructure 
and the efficiency of public services. For nearly a decade 
under the AKP, perceptions inside and outside Turkey re-
garding corruption, public trust in institutions and govern-
ment efficiency improved considerably. This trend slowed 
down and reversed after 2013 in a new period socio-poli-
tical crises, high level corruption charges against the go-
vernment and deteriorating civil liberties under what has 
become President (and former Prime Minister) Erdoğan’s 
increasingly illiberal rule. 
Despite this downturn, when it comes to perceptions 
of government effectiveness and control of corruption, 
Turkey’s overall record over the past 15 years still appears 
better than that of Brazil (Table 6)4.  Under the PT govern-
ment, Brazil witnessed the eruption of two major corrup-
tion scandals; the vote-buying scandal (Mensalão) of 2003, 
4 The World Bank’s index of Government Effectiveness “captures percep-
tions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the gover-
nment's commitment to such policies.” The index for Control of Corrup-
tion “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exerci-
sed for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests.” 
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and the Lava Jato investigation, launched in 2014, into high level graft and bribery allegations. These cases were influential 
in shaping public perceptions of the government and ultimately bringing about the PT’s downfall in 2016. 
Table 6 – Government effectiveness and Control of corruption
The picture changes somewhat when looking at the most recent trend, with slight improvement noted in perceptions of 
public sector corruption in Brazil after 2015, most likely a result of the continuation of high level prosecutions in the Lava 
Jato case, as opposed to continued deterioration in Turkey (Table 7). This view is also reflected in the Global Competitive-
ness Report 2017-18 of the World Economic Forum5.  However, both countries consistently underperform compared to Chile, 
another emerging economy. 
Table 7 – Perceptions of Corruption
Despite this modest upward trend, the WEF 2017-18 report paints a bleak overall picture regarding efficiency and trans-
parency of, and trust in, Brazilian public institutions (Table 8). It is particularly noteworthy that Brazil comes last among 
137 countries listed for ‘public trust in politicians’ and near the very bottom for ‘diversion of public funds’, ‘efficiency in go-
vernment spending’, and ‘transparency of government decision making’. Turkey comes across more favourably in all these 
categories. Its most problematic assessment is ‘favouritism in government decisions’, which points to enduring practices 
5 “After being rocked by corruption scandals and political instability, the institutions pillar recovers 11 positions, showing the effects of investigations lea-
ding to more transparency and a perception of successful proceedings to curb corruption within the institutional limits of Brazil’s constitution.” WEF, p. 
71. 
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of partisanship, clientelism and insufficient transparency in government-sponsored tenders, contracts and appointments.
WEF 2017-2018 Report Brazil rank (out of 137)/trend Turkey rank (out of 137)/trend
Country rank (overall) 80/ ↑ 55/↓ 
Institutions (overall) 109 71
Public trust in politicians 137 70
Diversion of public funds 134 38
Irregular payments & bribes 107 53
Favouritism in gov decisions 112 82
Efficiency in gov spending 133 38 (2016-17)
Transparency of gov decisions 127 42
Table 8 – Performance of public institutions
Finally, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency are listed among the top obstacles to doing business in Brazil by the WEF 
Executive Opinion Survey 2016. While inefficient government bureaucracy is also viewed as a major concern for businesses in 
Turkey, corruption only comes fourteenth with 2.7% of respondents citing it as a problem for doing business in the country. 
Most problematic for doing business (WEF, Executive Opinion Survey 2016)
Brazil Turkey
1. Tax rates 1. Inadequately educated workforce
2. Corruption (13.6%) 2. Access to financing
3. Tax regulations 3. Inefficient government bureaucracy (10.5%)
4. Inefficient government bureaucracy (11.9%) 4. Political instability
5. Political instability 5.Tax rates
...14. Corruption (2.7%)
Table 9 – Obstacles to doing business
This relative difference in the assessment of the two cou-
ntries’ institutions could be partly attributed to the pre-
viously mentioned divergences in their macroeconomic 
policies. Institutionally bound to and monitored by the 
IMF and the European Union, Turkey implemented far-re-
aching market liberalisation programmes in the 1990s and 
the early 2000s. Even though many of the other reforms 
enacted during this period (to curb corruption, improve 
government transparency, strengthen the rule of law and 
uphold civil liberties) have since been rolled back, Turkey 
has maintained its open-door policy to businesses and fo-
reign investment, which might explain its comparatively 
positive evaluation by the WEF. 
In contrast, Brazil under the PT government pursued a 
more protectionist path, keeping trade barriers and social 
welfare spending high, bankrolling national champions 
and maintaining the state as a central actor in the eco-
nomy. Bounded to a lesser degree by supra-governmental 
obligations than Turkey (and lacking an external anchor 
like the EU), the Brazilian government was able to pursue 
this path so long as it was being supported by surging com-
modity prices. Unsurprisingly, Brazil’s latest corruption 
scandal and the political turmoil erupted as commodity 
prices crashed and the country entered into recession. It 
is also no coincidence that the recent upward trend in the 
WEF assessment comes as the new Brazilian government 
pushes to enact new market-friendly legislations.
Besides macroeconomic policy, there are political and ins-
titutional factors that play a role in this divergent picture. 
Brazil’s hybrid system of coalitional presidentialism, with 
its division of power between the executive and the legis-
lature, which features a high number of undisciplined and 
personalistic parties, arguably renders policy-making ine-
fficient and opens the way to non-transparent and corrupt 
practices like vote-buying and graft for the sake of consen-
sus-seeking. 
In contrast, in the Turkish parliamentary system, the 
composition of the executive branch has been informed 
by the distribution of seats in the national assembly6. 
The country’s extremely high 10% national election 
threshold (a product of the junta-made 1982 Constitution 
which emphasised political centrism and efficiency over 
democratic representation) indirectly limits the number 
of parties that can enter the parliament. The system thus 
allows for highly disciplined and popular mass parties, 
like the AKP, to control both branches of government and 
enact legislation efficiently and without the need to strike 
non-transparent deals like those witnessed in Brazil. 
Political expediency, however, can come at the expense of 
democracy. The AKP’s sustained domination of the ballot 
box, and therefore Turkish politics, has led to a type of 
6 This will change once Turkey transitions into presidentialism in 2019, 
with the president and the parliament elected via separate (but simul-
taneous) elections. 
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institutional hegemony, which gradually saw the erosion of the democratic separation of powers and the country’s check-
-and-balance mechanisms. Both the PT and the AKP governments declared the corruption investigations that beset Brazil 
and Turkey in 2014 to be a judicial coup against the democratically elected government, and protested the media’s biased 
representation of the cases. But, in a telling contrast, only the AKP had the institutional capacity (and political audacity) to 
silence critical media outlets and suppress the criminal investigation.
III. Evolution of the Civil Service in Brazil and Turkey
A look at the evolution of the Brazilian and Turkish public administrations reveals a comparable history of institution-buil-
ding stretching back to the beginning of the 20th century. This century-long evolution is marked by five distinct periods of 
policy development and implementation (Table 10). In two of these five periods (the 1960s and 1980s) the reforms in Brazil 
and Turkey are opposite in nature and direction, while in the other three they share similar objectives and characteristics. 
a. The turn of the Century: European influences
Both countries entered the 20th century having embraced European (particularly French) inspired ideas of modernisation 
and progress. Influenced by the French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte, the First Republic in Brazil adopted “Order and 
Progress” as its national motto. Similarly, in the late Ottoman Empire, the secular nationalist political party that was inspired 
by French positivists and German romantic nationalists, and which seized power following the Constitutional Revolution of 
1908, was called the “Committee of Union and Progress”.
Progress was also the buzzword among Brazilian and Ottoman intellectuals, who deliberated the causes of their countries’ 
perceived backwardness vis-à-vis the ‘civilised’ nations of Europe and proposed various ways of catching up with the times7. 
Much like the French, Brazilian and Ottoman reformers of the 19th and the early 20th centuries saw the civil service through 
an imperial and modernist lens simultaneously, as an elite preoccupation and the institutional embodiment of a modern 
and rational state apparatus.
Brazil Turkey
Turn of the 20th 
century “Order and Progress” “Union and Progress”
Interwar Era
“New Republic” 
Reforms of Getulio Vargas (1934– 37) 
Centralisation, Rationalisation, Modernisation
“New Republic” 
Reforms of Kemal Atatürk (1923 – 38) 
Centralisation, Rationalisation, Modernisation
1960s
“Military dictatorship” 
Decree Laws 199 & 200 of 1967 
Decentralization & Delegation
“Military guardianship” 
Law 657 of 1965 (still in effect) 
Centralized, Weberian bureaucracy
1980s
“Re-democratisation” 
1988 Constitution 
Single Juridical Regime, Career System (Weberian)
“Neo-liberalisation” 
1982 Constitution 
Privatisations, Private sector practices in public 
sector
Turn of the millen-
nium
“Economic liberalisation” 
Cardoso reforms (1995 – 98) 
New Public Management ideas
“Europeanisation” 
EU reforms (1999 – 2005) 
New Public Management ideas
Table 10 – Evolution of the Civil Service in Brazil and Turkey
7 Brazilian and Turkish literary classics provide great satirical depictions of the ambitious but also rather superficial interpretation of ‘civilisation’ in the early 
20th century. Two examples that stand out are Jorge Amado’s Gabriela, Cravo e Canela and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s Time Regulation Institute. 
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Yet during the First Brazilian Republic (1889 – 1930) and the 
late Ottoman Empire (1879 – 1923), the lack of resources, 
expertise and/or political will (and in the Ottoman case, 
decades of warfare) meant that the discourse of progress 
and modernisation did not always successfully translate to 
actual policy, and that reforms targeting state institutions 
were superficial and non-programmatic.
b. The Interwar era: Modernising dictators
Both Turkey and Brazil undertook notable steps towards 
centralisation and rationalisation of the state apparatus 
under the presidencies of modernising strongmen, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk (1923 – 1938) and Getúlio Vargas (1939 – 45, 
1951 – 54). Under the founder and the first president of the 
modern Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal, the 600-year Ot-
toman monarchy and the 1500-year Islamic caliphate were 
abolished. Discarding Islamic legal code, the new republic 
adopted a secular civil code based on the Swiss model and 
a new penal code based on fascist Italy. With a law enacted 
in 1926 (no. 788) civil servants were officially designated as a 
distinct class within the state, separated from other govern-
ment employees. Laws enacted in 1927 (no. 1108) and 1929 
(no. 1452) were aimed at standardising the calculation of ci-
vil servant wages and the public service budget8.  However, 
until the 1960s Turkey lacked a coherent legal framework 
organising the administrative structure of the increasingly 
sprawling public sector.    
Under Vargas, Brazil adopted two constitutions: the Wei-
mar-inspired Constitution of 1934 was replaced in 1937 by a 
Polish-inspired text, which declared the Brazilian “New Re-
public” (Estado Novo) and established Vargas as dictator9. 
As part of his drive to centralise political power to counter 
the influence of the provincial oligarchy, Vargas carried out 
a series of administrative reforms between 1934 and 1937. 
The ‘Readjustment Law’ of 1934 introduced a merit-based 
professional system, which was a mix of position and care-
er schemes, and organised the first general classification of 
positions and salaries in the civil service10.  In 1937, a central 
agency (O Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público, 
DASP) was inaugurated and tasked with overseeing the or-
ganisation and management of the civil service apparatus. 
Despite the initiative for bureaucratic rationalisation, howe-
ver, political appointments continued to supersede merit-
-based appointments and professional careers11.
8 Republic of Turkey, State Personnel Presidency: http://www.dpb.gov.tr/
tr-tr. 
9 The civil rights curtailed by this constitution were restored, and the au-
thoritarian powers bestowed upon the president withdrawn, with the 
Constitution of 1945, which was enacted after Vargas was forced to re-
sign. 
10 Francisco Gaetani (2008) “Constitutional public management reforms 
in modern Brazil 1930-1998”, Unpublished PhD thesis, London School 
of Economics. 
11 Pedro Cavalcante and Paulo Carvalho (2017) “The professionalization 
of Brazilian federal bureaucracy (1995-2014): advances and dilemmas”, 
Rev. Adm. Pública, vol.51 no.1, Rio de Janeiro, Jan/Feb. 
Symbolising the purity and modernity of the republic, and 
the break-away from the ‘old and corrupted’ imperial past, 
Turkey’s capital was transferred from Istanbul to Ankara in 
1923. If cosmopolitan Istanbul on the shores of the Bospho-
rus represented the old elite, the new capital – previously a 
sleepy merchant town in the dusty interior of the country 
– would embody the young republic’s progressive ambition 
and connection with ‘the people’. To develop the city, mo-
dernist architects and urban planners were brought in from 
Switzerland and Austria. In the 1950s, Brazil pursued the 
same ideal with the construction of Brasília. Although inau-
gurated under Vargas’ successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, the 
transfer of the capital from Rio de Janeiro to the country’s 
interior in 1960 was the final achievement of the period of 
centralisation and modernisation ushered in by Vargas.
c. The 1960s: Under the generals’ shadow 
Politics in Turkey and Brazil came under the grip of their 
militaries in the 1960s, although the nature of the milita-
ries’ involvement in the two countries was different. In 
Brazil, the armed forces took over power following a coup 
d’état that toppled President João Goulart in 1964 and ru-
led the country directly until 1985. The first coup in Turkey 
took place in 1960. Although the military junta overthrew 
the elected government and had the constitution rewrit-
ten, it subsequently reinstated democratic elections and 
civilian politics in 1961. Unlike the military dictatorships of 
South Europe and Latin America, the Turkish military op-
ted for an indirect ‘guardianship’ role, influencing politics 
behind the stage through veto institutions like the Natio-
nal Security Council, but also through direct interventions 
when deemed necessary (i.e. the coups of 1971, 1980 and 
1997). The army returned power to civilians after every 
direct intervention, but not before making critical consti-
tutional changes that further empowered the military and 
the civilian high bureaucracy over elected politicians.
During the 1960s, the Brazilian military directly and the 
Turkish military indirectly oversaw the implementation 
of far reaching public sector reforms. The direction and 
the nature of the reforms enacted in the two countries, 
however, were notably different. In Brazil, the reform of 
1967, “one of the most important, widest, and most com-
prehensive public management reforms that Brazil had 
seen”12,  transformed the civil service from a centralised 
into a decentralised structure. The Decree Laws of 199 and 
200 created a direct and an indirect public sector, where 
the latter implied delegation of authority to autonomous 
governmental units on the basis of private sector employ-
ment and accountancy principles. Private sector practices 
were further expanded in the 1970s.13  These reforms de-
fined the organisation of the Brazilian public sector until 
re-democratisation in 1988. 
In Turkey, in contrast, the reforms introduced a centralised 
12 Gaetani (2008), p. 154
13 Ibid. 
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Weberian logic to the public administration. Adopted in 
1960, Law no. 160 established the State Personnel Depart-
ment under the office of the Prime Minister as a centrali-
sed administrative body, tasked with regulating and over-
seeing the recruitment, transfer, wages, promotion and 
advancement of civil servants and other public sector em-
ployees. Renamed the State Personnel Presidency in 1984 
and relocated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
in 2011, this agency continues to serve this core function 
today. Another critical reform during this period was the 
adoption of the Law no. 657 in 1965 (on Civil Servants), 
which “deals with service, appointment, promotion requi-
rements and features of civil servants in addition to their 
rights and responsibilities while acting as a civil servant”,14 
reorganising the civil service in a centralised career struc-
ture. Despite numerous amendments and periodic politi-
cal debates about replacing it altogether, the Law 657 is 
still in effect and serves as the basis of the public sector 
employment in Turkey15. 
d. The 1980s: Re-democratisation vs. Neo-
liberalisation
The next phase of public sector reforms took place in the 
1980s in both countries, although once again the nature 
of change was in opposite directions. In Brazil, the end of 
the military dictatorship and the beginning of the re-de-
mocratisation era provided fresh impetus for an overhaul 
of the public sector, which was widely perceived as having 
become ungovernable due to lack of coordination among 
autonomous divisions, and increasingly corrupt due to the 
high degree of unmonitored collusion of public and priva-
te interests. The establishment of a well-functioning, disci-
plined and centralised ‘bureaucratic elite’ came to be seen 
as a necessary aspect of institutionalising democracy.
Correspondingly, the Constitution of 1988 signalled a re-
turn to the Weberian idea of merit-based bureaucracy, 
through the empowerment of the direct administration 
and the adoption of a Single Juridical Regime (Regime Ju-
ridico Único, RJU) for civil servants. The new arrangement 
brought an end to private sector practices in the public sec-
tor, guaranteed tenure and full post-retirement benefits to 
civil servants, and established new classes and careers in 
the civil service. The 1988 Constitution also established 
the National School of Public Administration (ENAP) and 
the Centre for the Development of Public Administration 
(CEDAM), both under the Human Resources Secretariat, 
prioritising the training and qualifications of state person-
nel.16  
14 As stated in the notification by Turkey to the WTO at the time of the law’s 
ratification, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11090.
15 The provisions of the law will be discussed in more details in the 
following section. 
16 Cavalcante and Carvalho (2017). 
In contrast, Turkey in the 1980s experienced both an inten-
sification of the military’s non-democratic guardianship 
role and a radical shift to market liberalisation policies. 
While on the one hand, the right-wing military coup of 
1980 and the Constitution enacted by the junta in 1982 em-
powered the repressive apparatus of the central state over 
civilian politics, on the other hand it went on to weaken la-
bour laws and public sector unionisation, and initiated the 
privatisation of major public enterprises—a process that 
continued into the late 2000s. Although the Law 657 was 
maintained with its career structure intact, the scope for 
hiring contracted and temporary employees from outside 
the public service, first introduced in 1978, was expanded.
e. The Turn of the Millennium: Economic 
Liberalisation & NPM
First emerged and adopted in the early 1980s in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, 
New Public Management (NPM) is an administrative 
approach that instils private sector concepts such as 
competition, efficiency, decentralisation, consumer-focus 
and market-orientation into the public sector17.  As the 
US-led neo-liberal economic paradigm came to dominate 
the post-Cold War world order, NPM practices gained 
increasing global traction and were championed by 
supranational organisations like the United Nations, the 
World Bank and the IMF in reforming the public sector.
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, NPM also became 
a buzzword among liberal reformers in Brazil and Turkey 
who saw the traditional bureaucracy as an administrative 
failure, an economic burden, and, contrary to the earlier 
belief, an impediment to democratic governance. Ailing 
from chronic economic instability and inflationary 
pressures since the 1980s, both countries were also 
prescribed market-friendly reforms in exchange for loans 
from global lenders as part of their standby agreements 
with the IMF18.  As a result, this period witnessed efforts in 
both Brazil and Turkey to implement NPM practices in the 
civil service. In both cases, the reforms only had limited 
success due to the existence of popular, political and 
bureaucratic resistance, and limited political capital and 
enthusiasm on the side of the reformist actors.
In Brazil, a strong tendency for reform emerged during 
the first term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995 – 1998) who ran on a platform of macro-economic 
stabilisation, trade liberalisation and privatisation. The 
reforms were spearheaded by economist and former 
17 David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler (1993), Reinventing Government: How 
the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, New York: 
Penguin.
18 Brazil signed five standby agreements with the IMF between 1988 and 
2002, while Turkey signed seven agreements between 1980 and 2005; 
www.imf.org. 
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Minister of Finance Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, who 
served as the Minister of Federal Administration and 
Reform of the State during Cardoso’s first term. Bresser-
Pereira’s ambitious plan, as laid out in the 1995 Directive 
Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus (PDRAE) was to 
transform the state apparatus on the basis of the principles 
of rationalisation, flexibility and publicisation.19
Minister Bresser-Pereira succeeded to some degree in 
remodelling the rigid tenure system of the civil service 
and introducing more flexible new forms of employment 
arrangements, including private contracts. However, 
outspoken opposition from labour unions, resistance 
from the Congress and the bureaucracy, and low public 
enthusiasm for the reforms meant that the ambitious 
agenda could not be fully realised. The reformist 
zeal waned in Cardoso’s second term20.  Overall, the 
government’s initiatives appeared to have been more 
effective in shrinking the state through privatisations and 
decentralisation than transforming it: between 1989 and 
2001 the number of active civil servants in the executive 
branch declined from 705,508 to 485,741.21
As discussed earlier, Turkey had already embarked on 
the path of market liberalisation in the 1980s. But until 
the late 1990s, successive governments focused more 
on pushing through with privatisation deals instead of 
producing a clear vision or willingness to overhaul the 
public administration. Hundreds of thousands of public 
sector employees were laid off throughout the 1980 and 
the 1990s, while continually rising inflation led to a rapid 
deterioration in the living standards of civil servants, 
leading to the rise of ubiquitous petty corruption and 
a general difficulty in recruiting qualified personnel to 
the civil service. Corruption was not only overlooked but 
tacitly approved by leading political figures of the time as 
a necessary and natural practice for civil servants. When 
asked how public officials could be expected to survive 
with their meagre wages, Turgut Özal (Prime Minister 1983 
- 1989, President 1989 – 1993), the architect of Turkey’s 
market liberalisation reforms, famously responded “my 
civil servant knows his way around”.22
A comprehensive attempt to reform the public 
administration emerged following the Helsinki Summit 
of the European Council in 1999, in which Turkey was 
formally accepted as a candidate country for European 
Union membership. Reform of public service, including 
both increasing its flexibility and efficiency (NPM) and 
strengthening the merit principle (Weberian) was one of the 
four agenda points comprising the ‘Democracy and Rule of 
Law’ criterion of the EU accession process; the other three 
19 Cavalcante and Carvalho (2017), p.6-7.
20 Gaetani (2008) 
21 The reductions are a result of privatisations, decentralisation and 
“rushed” retirements preceding two periods of social security reform 
in 1998 and 2003. Cavalcante and Carvalho (2017). 
22 “Turgut Özal'ın Türk siyasetine armağan ettiği sözleri” [The quotes Tur-
gut Özal gifted to Turkish politics], Hürriyet, 17 April 2015. 
being the civilian control of the armed forces, reform of the 
judiciary and fight against corruption. In 2003, the newly 
elected AKP government initiated an Emergency Action 
Plan and set up a ministerial committee for Enhancing 
Transparency and Improving Good Governance.23  For the 
AKP and its coalition of liberal and conservative supporters, 
increasing political control over the bureaucracy was 
viewed as an integral part of disassembling the Kemalist 
military-led tutelary structures, although this would 
eventually lead to the rise of a new type of problem.
Important reforms undertaken in this period include: 
the organisation of a single examination system (Public 
Personnel Selection Exam, KPSS) for all public employees 
overseen by the State Personnel Presidency, adopted 
in 1999 and came into effect in 2002; the Public Finance 
Management Control Law (no. 5018) of 2003 that addresses 
issues of transparency, accountability and efficiency in the 
accountancy, reporting and monitoring of public finances; 
the Law on the Freedom to Obtain Information (no. 4982) 
of 2003;24  and the establishment under the Prime Ministry 
of a Council of Ethics for Public Services (Law no. 5176, of 
2004), tasked with determining ethical behavioural codes, 
carry out investigations and inquiries, and embed a culture 
of ethics in the public administration.25
In its Progress Report of 2004, the European Union praised 
the “new impetus” for reforming the public sector and 
concluded that “important progress has been achieved 
in increasing the transparency and efficiency of public 
administration, including public finances.”26  In 2005, in 
view of the government’s reform initiatives the European 
Council agreed to start full accession negotiations with 
Turkey.
There were also setbacks during this period. In 2005, 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer – a vocal Kemalist 
opponent of the AKP – vetoed the Framework Law on 
Public Administration, which would distribute power from 
the central administration to local administrations, on the 
ground that “it conflicted with the unitary character of 
the state”.27  In 2006, facing resistance from labour unions, 
the state bureaucracy, the parliamentary opposition, and 
a generally unsympathetic public, the AKP government 
abandoned a draft law aimed at replacing Law 657 on Civil 
Servants with a new system based on NPM framework 
and private sector practices that would expand the scope 
23 Didem Soyaltin (2017) Europeanization, Good Governance and Corrup-
tion in the Public Sector: The Case of Turkey, London: Routledge, p. 
72. 
24 The text of the law in English: http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclo-
sure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Turkey_
Right%20to%20Information%20Law_2004_en.pdf 
25 The text of the law in English: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/jsp/duyuru/
upload/Kanun.pdf 
26 Commission of The European Communities, 2004 Regular Report 
on Turkey’s progress towards accession, Brussels, 6 October 2004, 
p.70. 
27 European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 No-
vember 2005, p.11. 
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of hiring non-tenured ‘contract’ employees and the 
introduction of performance-related pay.
The AKP government was able to implement some of 
the proposed changes in piecemeal fashion by partially 
amending the Law 657 in 2010. The most notable of 
these was the introduction in 2011 of “experts” as a new 
sub-category of civil servants. Finally, the Law on the 
Ombudsman, which would establish an independent 
Ombudsman’s Office to investigate acts, attitudes and 
behaviours within the public administration in the 
framework of human rights-based justice, legality and 
fairness, was approved in 2006 but its implementation 
was suspended by the Constitutional Court, only to come 
into effect in 2012 in the aftermath of the Constitutional 
Referendum of 2010.28 
f. Recent Developments: PT and latter-AKP 
years
The NPM-inspired reform drives observed at the turn of 
the millennium in the two countries gradually lost steam 
and were ultimately shelved by the mid-to-late 2000s. In 
Brazil, the election of Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party 
(PT) as president in late 2002 signalled a return to the tra-
ditional view of bureaucracy, as part of the PT’s wider push 
to expand the role of the federal government as a central 
socio-economic actor. The number of civil servants in the 
executive branch, particularly in high managerial positions 
(DAS-4 to 6) increased significantly under PT governments, 
parallel to the establishment of new ministerial portfolios 
and the expansion of social policies.29  There were also 
changes in the wages of civil servants, reflecting Brazil’s 
economic growth patterns: 230% actual increase between 
2003 and 2010, followed by a subsequent actual decrease 
(despite nominal increase) due to inflationary pressures.30
The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 
and her replacement by former Vice-President Michel 
Temer signalled an intensified focus on market-friendly 
socio-economic policies, which Brazil had already turned 
to during President Rousseff’s second term in the midst 
of a recession. While the Temer government’s historically 
low public backing, corruption allegations facing the pre-
sident and questions of legitimacy surrounding his rise to 
power, prohibited this administration from advocating a 
comprehensive public administration reform policy, the 
20-year public spending freeze that the government lo-
cked into the constitution in late 201631  and the pension 
reform being pushing through the Congress at the time of 
28 For text of the Law no. 28338 in English: https://www.ombudsman.gov.
tr/contents/files/Law%20no_%206328-revised%20-edit(1).pdf 
29 Cavalcante and Carvalho (p.15) show that DAS positions increased by 
27% between 2003 and 2014. This is consistent with the rise in the 
number of civil servants in the federal executive during the same pe-
riod: up to 613,639 in 2014 from 485,741 in 2001. 
30 Ibid, p. 11. 
31 “Brazil senate approves austerity package to freeze social spending for 
20 years”, The Guardian, 13 December 2016. 
writing this report are likely to have a long-term impact 
on the Brazilian civil service.32 
In Turkey, the pace and the number of reforms declined 
parallel to the loss of steam in the country’s accession 
process to the European Union from mid-2000s onwards. 
Even with the reforms that were passed, implementation 
remained problematic. After the AKP’s third general elec-
tion victory in 2011, the once-reformist government took 
a sharp turn towards illiberal rule. A fierce split between 
the AKP and its former Islamist ally, the Gülen movement 
in early 2014 led to a high level corruption scandal invol-
ving top government officials and senior bureaucrats33. 
The government suppressed the subsequent investiga-
tion, and went on to purge hundreds of police officers 
and members of the judiciary believed to be linked with 
the Gülen movement. At the same time, reports surfaced 
of systematic cheating in the 2009 Police Academy en-
trance exams and the 2010 Public Personnel Selection 
Exam by the Gülenists, allegedly putting the movement’s 
members illegally above other candidates.34 
The picture deteriorated even more rapidly following the 
failed military coup attempt of 15 July 2016, which the go-
vernment blamed on Gülenist soldiers in the armed forces. 
A state of emergency was declared on 20 July, partially 
suspending rule of law and opening the path to rule by 
executive degree. This was followed by a purge of unpre-
cedented proportions of government opponents from the 
armed forces, the judiciary, the police and all levels, cate-
gories and ministries of the public administration. At the 
time of writing, over 150,000 state employees had been 
suspended or dismissed, with over 50,000 people (inclu-
ding journalists, businesspeople, NGO workers, politicians 
alongside public servants) in prison.35   
32 “Brazil's Temer unveils pension reform, sets retirement age at 65”, Reu-
ters, 5 December 2016. 
33 Gülen (also known as Hizmet, i.e. service) Movement is led by Turkish 
Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen who has been residing in the USA 
since 1999. Gülen publicly advocates a modernist view of Islam and ur-
ges his followers to focus on education and business initiatives. There 
are hundreds of Gülen-affiliated schools and cultural centres around 
the world, including in four cities in Brazil. The movement also has hi-
ghest number of charter schools in the US. In Turkey, the movement 
claims to be apolitical, i.e. not openly endorsing any political party, but 
has been cultivating followers in the state bureaucracy, the judiciary 
and the police for over two decades. These were instrumental in as-
sisting the AKP in its fight against the Kemalist military in the 2000s. 
But as soon as their common opponent was defeated, the inter-Isla-
mist alliance broke down and a power struggle emerged between the 
AKP and the Gülenists. See İştar Gözaydın (2009) “The Fethullah Gülen 
movement and politics in Turkey: a chance for democratization or a 
Trojan horse?”, Journal of Democratization, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 1214-
1236. 
34 A court nullified the results of the 2010 exam in 2016, two weeks af-
ter an attempted coup in Turkey. 150,000 people had taken the exam. 
“2010 KPSS iptal oldu! 150 bin memura ne olacak?” Milliyet, 3 August 
2016. 
35 John Dalhuisen, “In Turkey, defending human rights is a crime”, Poli-
tico, 19 July 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/amnesty-internatio-
nal-in-turkey-defending-human-rights-is-a-crime/  
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IV. Structure of the Civil Service in Brazil and Turkey
Twelve percent of the general workforce in Brazil, and 13% in Turkey, are employed in the public sector. This is lower than the 
OECD average of 19%. Beyond this, however, the two countries largely exhibit differences when it comes to Human Resource 
Management practices. Some of these are summarised in Table 11 (below). Building on this framework, this section will com-
pare the HRM practices in the Brazilian and Turkish public administration today, on the basis of their institutional structure, 
legal framework, recruitment and promotion practices, senior management procedures, gender balance, wage calculations, 
industrial relations and retirement and pensions systems. 
Brazil Turkey
Civil Servants in Fed 
Exec/Central Govt
633,003* 
(PEP, Feb 2018)
2,449,538** 
(SPP, Sept 2017)
Public sector emp. 
% of workforce 
(2013)
12 
[OECD average: 19%] 13
Central HRM Body
Secretariat of Personnel Management 
(Ministry of Planning, Development and Mana-
gement)
State Personnel Presidency 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security)
Recruitment system Mainly career based Mainly career based
Legal framework
Single Juridical Regime (Federal Law 8112) & 
the Consolidation of Labour Laws. 
Fixed term contracts governed by Law 8745/93.
Law 657 divides employees in 3 categories: 
Public Servants, Contract Employees, Workers
Recruitment process Formal competitions in each category. (quota system for disabled and black persons)
Centralised written exam (+oral interview) 
(quota system for disabled persons)
Promotion / Advan-
cement
Advancement is automatic based on years in 
service. Performance evaluation used for pro-
motion in most careers.
Advancement is automatic based on years 
in service. Promotion based on performance 
assessment (high importance), years in service, 
educational qualifications.
Wage calculation Compartmentalized collective bargaining Centralized collective bargaining
Staff can 
Unionise / Strike Yes / Yes Yes / No
Work conditions 
(2010/2012)
Average yearly working hours: 1766 
Annual leave: 30 
Public holidays: 10
Average yearly working hours: 1798 
Annual leave: 25 
Public holidays: 11
Retirement
After 35(m)/30(w) years of insurance contribu-
tion (or after 65 yrs w/ 15 yrs min. contribution)
Average: 56 years (m); 53 years (w)
Pre-2008 entry: 60 (m); 58 (w) 
Post-2008 entry: 60-65 (m); 58-65 (w) 
(25 years of min. insurance contribution)
Pension benefits Civil servants receive at least the minimum wage. Most receive full salary in retirement.
Pensions indexed to CPI, means-tested. Civil 
servants receive approx. 50-70% of salary in 
retirement
Table 11 – HRM Practices
* The total number of civil servants in Brazil is approximately 8.6 million, with 4.9 million employed at the municipal and 2.6 million at the state levels 
(Reudiger et al. 2016). The executive branch accounts for around 81% of all civil servants in the federal government, followed by the judiciary (15.2%) and 
the legislative (3.6%).
** Other centrally recruited public employees in Turkey are judges and prosecutors (17,400), teaching staff (128,277), contract employees (163,800), workers 
(320, 591), temporary personnel (20,363), and military personnel (241,389). Total number of public employees as of September 2017 is 3,341,358. It was not 
clear whether this number included employees suspended after the 2016 coup attempt.
a. Central HRM Body
In Brazil, the Secretariat of Personnel Management (SPM), based within the Ministry of Planning, Development and Ma-
nagement, is the body responsible for defining HRM practices. The agency was formerly known as the Human Resources 
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Secretariat until it received a new denomination in 2017.36 
The duties of the SPM include:
• Managing HRM at central/national level
• Providing leadership and guidance
• Coordinating and supervise HR policy/strategy
• Providing advice on legal framework
• Designing the pay system
• Defining and control the payroll
• Defining salary levels and benefits
• Managing retirement and pension plans
The SPM sets and oversees pay systems, budget allocation 
(which is presented by ministries and approved by the 
Congress) and post distributions. It manages recruitment 
and dismissal of public officials. Finally, the SPM coordina-
tes working conditions, performance appraisal, the code 
of conduct and equal opportunity issues. Despite this hi-
ghly centralised structure, there are still significant diffe-
rences between employment contracts across ministries.37 
In Turkey, the State Personnel Presidency (SPP) has the 
central coordination responsibility for HRM practices in 
Turkey. The SPP was established with Law no. 160 in 1960 
under the Prime Minister’s office. It was relocated to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security in 2011. Among its 
official duties are:38 
• Determining the principles of legal and financial status 
of civil servants and their implementation.
• Preparing and reviewing legislation drafts about the 
public personnel system.
• Determining principles to meet the personnel needs of 
public institutions.
• Monitoring and evaluating administrative methods 
and principles regarding public personnel.
• Conducting reviews related to job analyses and titles.
• Collecting statistical information about civil servants, 
keeping records of the staff centrally.
• Organising, supervising and evaluating personnel trai-
36 See Law 13,341 of 29 September 2016 and Decree No. 9,035 of 20 April 
2017. 
37 OECD, Human Resources Management Country Profiles, Brazil, Decem-
ber 2012. 
38 Republic of Turkey, State Personnel Presidency: http://www.dpb.gov.
tr/tr-tr. 
ning programmes.
• Determining the principles of the Central Placement 
Examination.
• Conducting studies to improve the distribution of ser-
vices, organisational methods and legislations, and to 
correct institutional failures and defects.
• Organising the transfer of staff who are in employment 
surplus or subject to transfer in organisations that are 
under the scope of privatisation programme or restruc-
turing period to other institutions and organisations.
The SPP plays a dominant role in HRM practices in Turkey, 
particularly regarding personnel, pay and performance. 
Ministries have less input on HRM practices in Turkey than 
the average OECD country. Although the SPP uses syste-
matic forward planning over a broad range of issues (wi-
thin a short horizon of one year), HRM targets are not con-
sidered in performance assessments, and ministries’ HRM 
capacities are not regularly assessed.39  In its 2016 Progress 
Report on Turkey, the European Commission stated that 
the SPP lacked the necessary coordination and monitoring 
capacities to ensure the implementation of modern HRM 
policy and standards. The report also emphasised the ab-
sence of a “modern HRM information system, which would 
provide real-time data for the entire public service” as ano-
ther obstacle to an efficient HRM system.40 
b. Legal Framework
In Brazil, the employment of the permanent staff in the 
state and federal government is organised by the Single 
Juridical Regime (RJU), the principles of which were laid 
down during the era of re-democratisation, and legalised 
with Federal Law 8112 of 1990 and the Consolidated La-
bour Laws. The RJU law applies to federal civil servants in 
ministries, autarchies and foundations. The Consolidated 
Labour Laws apply to employees of public enterprises. 
Contract employment is allowed and organised under 
Federal Law 8745 of 1993. Finally, civil servants within in-
dividual states and municipalities are subject to laws and 
regulations adopted by local legislatures themselves. As 
of February 2018, according to Painel Estatístico de Pesso-
al (PEP), 94% of the civil servants in the federal executive 
were employed under the RJU, 1.85% on temporary con-
tracts and 0,75% under Consolidated Labour Laws.
39 OECD, Human Resources Management Country Profiles, Turkey, De-
cember 2012. 
40 European Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 No-
vember 2016, p.16. 
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In Turkey, the Law no. 657, adopted in 1965, continues to form the legal basis of the public sector personnel system, despite 
numerous amendments (17 changes to the text between 2004 and 2015) and attempts to replace it (in 1996, 1999 and 2005). 
While the law establishes a closed, statute-based personnel regime based on the principles of merit, class and career, most 
of the reform attempts and amendments in the past decades have been aimed at rendering the public service more open, 
efficient, flexible and inclusive of private sector practices. As a result, rather than providing a coherent framework for the civil 
service, the law is often criticised for being a patchwork, reflecting instances of contradictory administrative philosophies. 
Law 657 divides employees into three categories: civil servants, who carry out “essential and permanent public services”; 
contract employees, who are employed on a temporary basis for special tasks and assignments; and workers, who fall out-
side other categories and are employed for an indefinite term (Article 4).41
Article 36 of the law categorises civil servants under 12 classes:
1. General Administration Services
2. Technical Services (such as engineers, architects, geologists, physicists, chemical experts, economists, mathematicians, urban planners)
3. Medical Services and Contributory Medical Services
4. Public Education Services (teachers and university professors)
5. Legal Services (state lawyers)
6. Religious Services
7. National Security Services (covering members of the police force)
8. Gendarmerie Services
9. Coast Guard Services *
10. Auxiliary Services
11. Civil    Administration    Chief    Services (governors and district governors)
12. National Intelligence Services
Table 12 – Classes of Civil Servants in Turkey
* Previously under the General Command of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard were fully transferred to the Interior Ministry with the 
Executive Decree no. 668, following the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016.
The law stipulates that civil servants swear an oath of allegiance to serve the constitution and the laws of the Turkish Re-
public (Article 6). They are barred from joining political parties or becoming involved in political or ideological activities 
(Article 7). Unless tasked to do so by ministers, they cannot publicise information or opinions regarding administrative af-
41 “Workers” are subjected to a different legislation. A fourth category (“temporary employees”, who are contracted for less than one year) was removed with 
the Executive Decree No. 696 on 20 November 2017. 
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fairs via any media channel (Article 14). Civil servants are 
barred from organising, joining, supporting or carrying out 
industrial strike actions (Article 27). They cannot engage 
in any private sector activity or seek private profit while in 
the civil service (Article 28).
This system stands in sharp contrast with the career system 
in Brazil, where there are over 250 established careers wi-
thin the public administration. Turkey’s broad classification 
system has been an issue of contention for many years. A 
government-sponsored “Public Administration Research 
Report” (Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması Raporu, KAYA) in 1991 
stated that the “broad coverage classification system lumps 
together different careers and areas of expertise without re-
gard for their particular characteristics and the need for dif-
ferent personnel procedures”.42  This view has been echoed 
in numerous OECD and EU reports on HRM practices in the 
Turkish public administration as well.43  
The introduction of ‘experts’ in 2011 as a sub-category of 
civil servants was ostensibly an attempt to overcome this 
arbitrary broadness. However, the SPP also defined ‘ex-
perts’ in a broad manner, as those professions involving 
duties of “producing strategies, researching, planning, 
programming, administration and inspection and who 
exercise power”. Provisions were made for the recruit-
ment of experts in government ministries and central sta-
te agencies. Critics have argued that creating specialised 
employment categories with decentralised recruitment 
procedures would violate the career and merit principles 
of the Civil Service Law.44 
c. Recruitment Process
Recruitment to the civil service in Brazil is predominantly 
based on competitive examinations for each category or 
career, organised separately by the relevant ministry. The-
se are open to all candidates who fulfil basic requirements. 
Senior management positions are open to some external 
appointment. According to Article 41 of the Constitution, 
entrants to the civil service gain tenure after three years in 
the service. During the probation period, the entrants are 
evaluated twice a year by their immediate superiors.
There is a quota system in place for the recruitment of bla-
cks and disabled persons in the federal administration. 
The former is organised by Law No. 12,990 of 9 June 2014, 
which reserves for black citizens 20% of the vacancies offe-
red in public tenders and public jobs in the federal public 
administration, municipalities, public foundations, public 
companies and mixed economy companies controlled by 
the Federal government. The latter is organised under the 
National Policy for the Integration of Persons (based on De-
42 Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü (1991) Kamu Yönetimi 
Araştırması Genel Rapor [General Report of the Public Administration 
Research], TODAİE Yayınları, No. 28. 
43 “The Law on Civil Servants defines public service in a way that is ex-
tremely broad”, says the European Commission in its Turkey Progress 
Report, 2016, p. 15. 
44 Birgül Ayman Güler (2010), “657’yi Değiştirmek: 9 Haziran 2010 Tasarısı 
Üzerine”, Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, 3 July. 
cree 3298, dated 20 December 1999) and overseen by the 
National Council for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CONADE), established within the Ministry of Justice. The 
law requires institutions and companies with over hundred 
employees to fill 2 to 5% of their positions with “rehabilita-
ted Social Security beneficiaries or disabled persons”.
Recruitment in Turkey is carried out through a centrally or-
ganised examination system. There are two types of exams: 
Examination A for ‘experts’; Examination B for other civil 
servants. Successful participants of Examination B are re-
cruited without further examination as ‘candidates’ on the 
basis of available vacancies. Candidates first go through a 
basic education programme, organised by the SPP, cove-
ring common qualifications of civil servants, followed by 
a preparatory training programme in their own area, and 
finally an internship programme. Those who successfully 
complete all three stages of the training are appointed as 
civil servants. Candidacy period cannot be less than 1 and 
more than 2 years.
Successful participants of Examination A (for ‘experts’) 
take additional exams (typically oral interviews) organi-
sed by relevant ministry or agency following the central 
examination. Those who qualify in this second round of 
examinations become ‘assistant experts’. Assistant experts 
are subjected to an occupational training of three years; af-
ter which they prepare a dissertation. When they pass the 
proficiency test and successfully defend their dissertation, 
they are appointed ‘expert’ titles.45
Since 2011, all public institutions are required to have a 3% 
quota for disabled employees. Examination, training and 
recruitment processes for disabled employees are organi-
sed separately by the SPP. Although progress was reported 
in recent years in the recruitment of disabled staff (with 
an increase from 40,655 in 2015 to 43,151 in 2016), the net 
number was still short of the 3% quota.46  
Serious concerns have been raised in recent years in Turkey 
regarding the poorly regulated, non-transparent conduct 
of oral interviews as an increasingly widespread means 
for political patronage in the recruitment and promotion 
of civil servants.47  Numerous cases have been raised (in 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Pri-
me Ministry, the State Radio and Television, and the Postal 
Service) about successful candidates being eliminated in 
the oral stage apparently due to their political or religious 
backgrounds. On two occasions in 2017, the Council of Sta-
te ruled that promotions in the Ministries of Education and 
Finance had violated the merit principle.
Another violation of the merit principle in the recruitment 
process is the mass conversion of temporary contracts 
into permanent civil service positions. This is particularly 
used as a political pre-election strategy. Shortly before the 
2011 general election, the AKP government converted the 
45 Republic of Turkey, State Personnel Presidency: http://www.dpb.gov.
tr/tr-tr. 
46 Ibid., p.16. 
47 European Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 No-
vember 2016, p.15. 
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status of around 200,000 (out of the existing 260,000) con-
tract workers into permanent positions. A further 100,000 
contract employees became civil servants in 2013, ahead 
of the presidential election the following year.48  Instead of 
taking the centrally organised entrance exam, these em-
ployees only had to pass oral interviews conducted within 
their institutions.
Finally, a large number of ministries and departments 
were reportedly allowed to by-pass the central examina-
tion requirement to hire thousands of civil servants in the 
aftermath of the post-2016 coup attempt, when more than 
150,000 public employees were suspended or dismissed. 
Applicants were expected to meet certain educational cri-
teria, pass the background check and an oral interview. 
The legal basis that the government relied on for this pro-
cess was Article 59 of Law 657, which regulates external 
appointments to “exceptional positions”.49  
d. Promotion and Advancement
In Brazil, applicants that wish to change between hierarchi-
cal grades or categories within the public service must un-
dertake a new competition with competitive examination. 
The automatic progression by length of service is not adop-
ted in most federal administration careers. In most careers, 
promotion depends on performance evaluation combined 
with the length of service and other criteria.
In Turkey, there is a distinction between promotion and ad-
vancement: Advancement is automatic and based on the 
years in service. Law 657 sets a grade system for advance-
ment, consisting of 15 grades with 1 being the highest. Each 
grade has three degrees. A civil servant moves up one degree 
every year, and one grade every three years, depending on 
successful performance assessment and educational quali-
fications. Promotion is moving up hierarchically to a higher 
job title. Requisites include performance assessments and 
educational qualifications, as well as in-service training and 
successful performance in examination. The OECD has prai-
sed the transparent listing of position and the meritocratic 
use of assessment centres and examinations. However, as 
noted above, the increasing use of poorly regulated oral in-
terviews since 2011, particularly following the failed coup 
attempt of 2016, is seen as undermining both the transpa-
rency and merit principles of the promotion process.
Performance assessments are of high importance both 
for the career advancement of civil servants. They are writ-
ten annually by immediate superiors, covering categories 
such as “activities undertaken, timeliness and quality of 
outputs, values, interpersonal skills, improvement of com-
petencies”.50 
48 “Torpilliler Bir Gün Sözleşmeli Çalışıp Devlet Memuru Olmuş” [Privile-
ged employees made civil servants after a single day under contract], 
Haberler.com, 9 December 2014. 
49 “Devlet KPSS'siz memur alacak” [State to hire civil servants without 
central exam], Yeni Çağ, 15 August 2016. 
50 OECD, Human Resources Management Country Profiles, Turkey, De-
cember 2012. 
Educational qualifications also impact the entry level and 
highest achievable degree of a civil servant. For instance, 
those with only primary education qualifications (8-years) 
enter at level 15 and can rise up to level 7. University gra-
duates enter the civil service at grade 9.
e. Senior Management
Senior public service roles in the Brazilian federal gover-
nment are organised under the DAS (High Level Manage-
ment and Advisory) system, which is a product of the 1967 
reforms. There positions are hierarchically organised, with 
DAS-6 being the highest (reserved for secretaries, directors 
and presidential undersecretaries). These positions are 
more open to external appointment than normal civil ser-
vice positions. Ministries manage their own recruitment 
process. “The president and minister have influence over 
the appointment/dismissal of the highest level of manage-
ment, with the ministry head and others in ministry having 
influence over that of lower management levels”.51
The appointment criteria for DAS positions have recently 
undergone changes. According to Decree 9021 of 2017, 
50% of total positions DAS levels 1 to 4, and 60% of total 
positions at DAS levels 5 and 6 should be occupied exclusi-
vely by career civil servants. (Previously, this was 75% for 
DAS-1 to 3 and 50% for DAS-4 to 6, based on Decree 5497 of 
2005). This change was accompanied by the elimination of 
approximately 10,000 DAS posts. These were replaced by 
Commissioned Functions of the Executive Branch (FCPE), 
which are exclusively for career civil servants (Law 13,346 
of 10 October 2016). As a result, the number of DAS posi-
tions were considerably reduced, from some 23,000 before 
the changes to 11,372 in February 2018.52 
Turkey also uses separate HRM practices for senior mana-
gement level public officials. Senior management refers to 
the top four grades of the 15-grade advancement ladder. 
These include undersecretaries, deputy undersecreta-
ries, departmental presidents and vice-presidents, cen-
trally-appointed governors and deputy governors, among 
others. Appointments from outside the civil service to 
these positions have been possible since 1984. Changes 
to the Civil Service Law in 2011 facilitated this further by 
allowing applicants’ private sector background to be con-
sidered in fulfilling the experience criteria. These positions 
are particularly susceptible to politicisation and patrona-
ge. The European Commission in its 2016 Progress Report 
on Turkey stated that “access to top civil service positions 
is not always merit-based, and appointments are not sub-
ject to competition.”53
51 OECD, Human Resources Management Country Profiles, Brazil, Decem-
ber 2012. 
52 Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão, Sérias Estatis-
ticas, http://www.planejamento.gov.br/servicos/series-estatisticas/
series-estatisticas. 
53 European Commission, Turkey 2016 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 No-
vember 2016, p.15. 
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f. Gender Balance
Underrepresentation of women in the civil service remains an enduring problem in Turkey, where women make up slightly 
more than a third of all public servants. The numbers drop further at the level of senior management, where just below 8% 
of the senior positions are occupied by women. In contrast, women hold a majority of public offices in Brazil, in line with the 
OECD average. Although they are also under-represented in senior management, particularly at the highest level (DAS-6), 
the percentage of women in senior management in Brazil is considerably higher when compared to Turkey and (considering 
DAS-5 & 6) also above the OECD average. 
Women in  
Public Service  
(OECD 2015)
Brazil Turkey OECD Average
% in public service 59.29 33.8 58.35
% in senior management 21.8 (DAS-6)  41.1 (DAS-5 & 6) 7.98 32.37
Table 13 – Women in Public Service
 
g. Wage Calculation
The wage bargaining process is conducted by the Secretariat for Personnel Management in Brazil. However, the political 
weight of each career and ministerial power play an important role in determining the outcome of these processes. This can 
lead to inconsistencies between the salaries of public officials at comparable levels in different careers due to imbalances in 
the bargaining powers of different ministries and unions. Wage determinants tend to include complexity of duties, required 
skills, inherent responsibilities and performance.54  As noted in the previous section, a 230% net increase in public official 
wages was observed between 2003 and 2009, followed by a net decrease despite nominal rise due to inflationary pressures.
Wage rises in Brazil were an outcome of the growing economy as well as the PT government’s close ties with labour unions, 
and were justified on the basis of the necessity to compete with the private sector.55  In 2017, a World Bank study found that 
federal civil servants earned 67% more than private sector employees in a similar role, training and experience; the highest 
difference in a sample of 53 countries surveyed.56  According to the Bank, this contributed to the inequality in the country, 
with 54% of Brazil’s civil servants being placed among the richest 20%, and 77% are among the richest 40%.57
In 2015, the total public sector wage spending (comprising federal, state and municipal governments) amounted to 13.1% of 
the GDP, compared to 9% in the United States, 6.4% in Chile and around 8% in Turkey.58  Despite making up a small minority 
of civil servants in all three levels, federal government wages were responsible for a disproportionate amount of this spen-
ding, accounting for about 4 to 5% of the GDP between 2001 and 2014 alone (Table 14).
Civil servants in the federal executive make up more than 80% of all public officials in the three branches of power, but earn 
considerably less on average than their counterparts in the judiciary and the legislature. Finally, within the federal executive, 
a significant gap exists between the average wages in the strategic core careers and the general civil service, with the average 
wage of the latter being 29% of the former (despite some reduction since 2009).59  
54 Marconi, Nelson (2010) “A gestão de recursos humanos no governo federal: diagnóstica e proposta”, Digesto Econômico, v. 457, p. 80-89. 
55 Cavalcante and Carvalho (2017), p. 10 
56 World Bank (2017), “Um Ajuste Justo: Análise da eficiência e equidade do gasto público no Brasil”, Brasil: Revisão das Despesas Públicas, November. On 
wage differentials, also see Emilio, Daulins, Vladimir Ponczek and Fernando Botelho (2012) “Evaluating the wage differential between public and private 
sectors in Brazil”, Rev. Econ. Polit. vol.32 no.1 São Paulo Jan./Mar. 
57 “Servidor público ganha 67% a mais que o privado no Brasil, diz Banco Mundial”, Estado do São Paulo, 21 November 2017. 
58 World Bank (2017), “Um Ajuste Justo: Análise da eficiência e equidade do gasto público no Brasil”, Brasil: Revisão das Despesas Públicas, November 
59 Cavalcante and Carvalho (2017), p. 10. 
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In Turkey, base salary calculations are negotiated through comprehensive collective bargaining, often encompassing both 
the public and the private sectors simultaneously (organised by Law no. 6356 of 2012). Collective bargaining involves mee-
tings, usually every two years, between officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and representatives from 
employer unions (for private sector negotiations) and the largest labour confederations. Wage calculations in the civil service 
include educational qualifications, job content, specific ministry, seniority and relative experience, as well as marital status 
and the number of children. Performance-relayed pay has been introduced only recently and in a limited scope (involving 
some experts) but has been criticised for being poorly regulated and therefore open to political patronage.
Public sector wages made up on average about 7-8% of Turkey’s GDP between 2008 and 2013. Given Turkey’s unitary state 
structure, where the central state employs more than 2.4 million civil servants (over 3 million public sector employees in 
total), this figure should be compared to the total proportion of public sector wage spending in Brazil (13,1%) as opposed to 
just the federal government.
Brazil 
(PEP, 2017)
Turkey 
(SPP, 2017)
Highest Salary 
[in Feb 18 USD]
R$ 29,133.55 (Nível Superior) 
[USD 9,006.35]
TL 10,852.40 
[USD 2,874]
Lowest Salary  
[in Feb 18 USD]
R$ 1.467,49 (Nível Auxiliar) 
[USD 453.65]
TL 2,829.84 
[USD 749]
Wages % of GDP 
(World Bank Dataset 2015)
4-5 (federal gov) 
13.1% (total) 7-8
Table 14 – Civil Service Wages
A striking contrast between Brazil and Turkey is in wage 
brackets. While the maximum salary of a civil servant 
in Brazil is nearly three times the maximum salary of a 
Turkish civil servant, employees in the lowest end of the 
salary scale in Turkey earn more than their Brazilian cou-
nterparts, revealing a significant salary gap between high 
and low earners in the Brazilian public sector. The diffe-
rence between public official salaries in Brazil and Turkey 
would be even wider if additional benefits were factored 
in, which tend to be very generous in Brazil, particularly in 
elite careers.60
Both countries publicise details of public service employee 
salaries. In Turkey, these are announced at the end of the 
comprehensive collective bargaining sessions. In Brazil, 
the publication of salaries is a relatively new practice that 
started in 2012 following the enforcement of the Freedom 
of Information Act and the appearance of the Transparen-
cy Portal.
h. Industrial Relations
Comparing industrial relations in Brazil and Turkey reveals 
another stark contrast between the two countries (Table 
16). In Brazil, trade union density in the general workforce 
is around 19% and unions have a collective bargaining co-
ver of 60%.61  Around 55% of the public officials in the fede-
ral executive are unionised.62  The right of Brazilian public 
service employees to join unions and to strike is enshrined 
in the 1988 Constitution (civil servants working directly in 
the area of public security are not entitled to strike right). 
60 Simon Romero, “Brazil, Where a Judge Made $361,500 in a Month, Fu-
mes Over Pay”, New York Times, 10 February 2013. 
61 “Cai o número de centrais sindicais reconhecidas pelo governo”, CNM/
CUT, 2012. 
62 OECD, Human Resources Management Country Profiles, Brazil, Decem-
ber 2012. 
Unions have played an important role in negotiating public 
employees’ salaries and rights since re-democratisation, 
especially under the PT government. An important step in 
the protection of workers’ rights and workplace standards 
was taken in 2010 when the Brazilian Congress ratified ILO’s 
Convention 151 and Recommendation 159. 
Strikes are common in the Brazilian civil service, with one 
study showing that civil servant strikes (across federal, 
state and municipal levels) amounting to 45.3% of all re-
corded strikes in the country between 2002 and 2012. The 
same study found that at the level of the federal govern-
ment, public officials in the executive branch had the most 
amount of strikes, being responsible for 52.9% of the total 
working-hours lost as a result of strike action.63
In Turkey, on the other hand, trade unions have been he-
avily suppressed and weakened since the 1980 military 
coup. As noted earlier, public servants in Turkey can join 
unions but they are barred from organising or supporting 
any industrial strike action. Public officials taking part in 
strikes can face disciplinary measures.
However, in a number of instances these measures have 
been repealed by the Court of State, creating an ambi-
guous legal environment where striking is both prohibi-
ted and often practically tolerated.
The greatest decline in unionisation took place under the 
AKP governments, due to the “gradual legalization of va-
rious forms of precarious and temporary work, especially 
under the subcontracting schemes”.64  While 29% of the 
63 Walter A. Pichler and Giovana Menegotto (2015) “Union Membership 
and Industrial Action In Brazilian Public Sector in the 2000s”, Paper 
presented at GT-17 ‘Reestructuración Productiva, Trabajo y Domina-
ción Social’, Congreso ALAS 2015, Costa Rica. 
64 Bilge Yabancı (2016) “Populism as the problem child of democracy: 
the AKP’s enduring appeal and the use of meso-level actors”, Jour-
nal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 
600. 
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general workforce was unionised in 2001, this number had fallen to 8% by 2015; significantly below the 17% OECD average. 
Furthermore, only 7% of unionised workers were entitled to collective bargaining in 2016.65  It might seem curious, given this 
background, that more than two thirds of public servants in Turkey are unionised. More striking is the fact that public sector 
unionisation increased by 149% between 2002 and 2016.
Brazil 
(2012)
Turkey 
(2016)
OECD Average 
(2016)
Union Density  
(general labour force) 19 6.3 (2015) 17
Collective Bargaining Cover 
(general labour force) 60 7 32
% of Unionisation in Civil 
Service 55 68 n/a
Table 15 – Union density and coverage
This increase is almost exclusively due to a spectacular rise in the membership of a single union: Memur-Sen, which was 
a relatively young and small civil service confederation before the emergence of the AKP in 2002. Between 2002 and 2016, 
Memur-Sen’s membership increased from 42,000 to 936,000 (a 2129% increase). In contrast, during the same period, mem-
bership in Turkey’s most established confederation, KESK, fell by 16%. Unlike the left-leaning KESK, which is fully indepen-
dent from the government, conservative Memur-Sen has close informal ties with the AKP both in terms of cadres (several of 
its leaders have resigned to run on the AKP ballot to become MPs) and political discourse.
Yabancı explains that “the astonishing increase in the membership of Memur-Sen […] is mostly related to co-optation and 
intimidation strategies [of the AKP government] that oblige workers and civil servants to quit their previous trade unions or 
recruit non-associated workers as members of preferred trade unions.”66  In turn, the government has designated Memur-
-Sen as its main interlocutor at the collective bargaining stage and favoured it through relevant legislation, including the 
2012 Law (no. 6356), which, while reducing the threshold for union participation in collective bargaining from 10% to 3%, 
also legalised the selective implementation of thresholds favouring unions with the largest number of members.67
i. Retirement & Pension Systems
Brazil has a more generous retirement and pension programme compared to Turkey and the OECD average. There is no 
fixed minimum age for retirement; men can retire after 35 years and women after 30 years of contribution to the system. 
Those who have contributed for 15 years can retire at the age of 65 (men) and 60 (women). The OECD average for minimum 
contribution is 26 years. Average retirement age in Brazil is 56 for men and 53 for women. A government proposal to set the 
minimum age as 65-years and minimum contribution to 25 years is currently in the Congress.
According to the OECD, pension and social assistance system in Brazil cost over 10% of the GDP in 2016. Under the current 
scheme, this would be expected to rise to 20% of the GDP by 2060 due to aging population and increased lifespan. The pen-
sion system for civil servants currently makes up 2.2% of the GDP. 
Pensions of retired civil servants from the Single Juridical System (RJU) are adjusted by the same indexes that are applied 
to the wages of active civil servants. The pensions of public employees hired under the Consolidated Labour Laws are read-
justed by the indexes of the social security system. All pension recipients receive at least the minimum wage and most civil 
servants continue to receive their full salary after retirement.68
Brazil 
(2016)
Turkey 
(2016)
OECD Average 
(2016)
Retirement Age Average: 56 (m), 53 (w)
Minimum:  
60-65 (m)  
58-65 (w)
Average: 
64 (m), 63 (w)
Minimum Contribution 15 years 25 years 26 years
Pension System % of GDP 10 8.1 8.2
Pensions indexed to Based on employment framework CPI n/a
Table 16 – Retirement and Pension
65 OECD.Stats:http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=80973# 
66 Ibid, p. 601. 
67 Ibid.; Işıl Erdinç (2014) “AKP Döneminde Sendikal Alanın Yeniden Yapılanması ve Kutuplaşma: Hak-İş ve Ötekiler” [Restructuring the field of trade unions 
and polarisation: Hak-Is and others]. Çalışma ve Toplum, Vol. 2, pp. 155–174. 
68 OECD Policy Memo, “Pension Reform in Brazil”, April 2017. 
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In Turkey, for those who entered the social security system 
before October 2008, the minimum retirement age is 60 
for men and 58 for women. For the who enter the system 
after October 2008, retirement age gradually increases to 
65 for men and 65 for women. The minimum contribution 
period is 25 years. In 2016, the public pension spending 
was 8.1% of GDP, in line with the OECD average. Pensions 
are indexed to CPI, updated twice a year in January and 
July. Pensions are means-tested and payable only to those 
who receive no other social security benefits, are disabled 
or over 65 years old. A rough calculation of average public 
salaries to pensions suggests that civil servants in Turkey 
receive about 50 to 70% of their working salary as pension 
in retirement. 
V. Evaluation and Conclusion
A legacy of their imperial past, civil service was long seen 
as an elite preoccupation in both Brazil and Turkey. In the 
19th and early 20th centuries, Brazilian and Ottoman-
-Turkish reformers maintained this imperial view but su-
pplemented it with a modernist perspective, inspired by 
the ideas positivism and rationalism, which treated civil 
service as the embodiment of a modern, well-functioning 
and rational nation-state. During the course of 20th cen-
tury, Brazilian and Turkish governments initiated periodic 
reform attempts aimed at institutionalising a centralised 
and professional public administration in pursuit of this 
elusive goal.
Turkey and Brazil arrived at a crossroads in the 1980s – a 
time when the traditional Weberian view of bureaucracy 
came to be challenged by market forces and new liberal 
economic ideas – and chose different paths. Turkey, under 
the tutelage of its military and led by successive centre-ri-
ght governments, was transformed almost overnight into 
a free-market economy. With this transformation came at-
tempts to open up the civil service to private sector ideas 
and practices. The institutional result has been a hybrid 
bureaucracy, which maintains its original Weberian legal 
framework, but with sizeable and growing patches mirro-
ring NPM thinking.
In contrast to Turkey, the architects of Brazil’s re-democra-
tisation saw civil service in the traditional lens, as a buil-
ding block of a rational and democratic state. In 1988, they 
went on to strengthen – not weaken – its centralised, me-
ritocratic, career-based structure. Although Brazil also has 
a mixed system of career and contract employment in the 
public service, the career structure has been more succes-
sfully preserved than in Turkey.
As a result, as elaborated in the previous section, the two 
civil services today face considerably different sets of pro-
blems and challenges. The Brazilian civil service is widely 
considered one of the more competent, professional and 
meritocratic bureaucracies around the world, and perhaps 
the most so in its region. Competitive salaries (especially 
at the senior level), labour laws favouring employees, a 
generous pension system and a well-established career 
structure manage to attract qualified Brazilian men and 
women, who would otherwise seek private employment. 
In a country where trust for political actors and elected of-
ficials is extremely low, career civil servants appear to have 
maintained a more respectable popular image. In some 
cases, they are even seen as protectors of the citizens’ best 
interests against corrupt politicians, as the surge in popu-
lar support for judges and prosecutors of the Lava Jato in-
vestigation reveals. Future reformers of the Brazilian state 
would do well to maintain the core structures that enable 
these successful outcomes.
The downside of this picture is that in a country with such 
drastic socio-economic inequality and rampant corruption 
on every level of government, civil servants in elite posi-
tions, who receive life-long benefits on par with their coun-
terparts in the most developed countries, form a privileged 
class of their own. Seen from this perspective, one could 
argue that the civil service in Brazil has not quite shed its 
imperial era self-image.
The motivation to maintain this privileged status, and re-
sisting transparency and political interference in the pro-
cess, can be at odds with the public interest. This, in turn, 
contributes to entrenched inequalities both in the wider 
society, but also within the civil service itself, as eviden-
ced by the wide pay gap between high and low earners in 
the public service. It also poses a problem for democratic 
accountability when civil servants start seeing themselves 
(or are seen by parts of the public) as a separate branch of 
power or a tutelary force. Addressing the issue of undue 
privileges, without hampering the meritocratic and profes-
sional structure of the civil service, is a challenge for Bra-
zil’s reformers.
At the federal level, part of the problem appears to stem 
from politics itself, particularly in the way the coalitio-
nal structure enfeebles political authority and effectively 
produces corruption. An enfeebled and corrupt political 
apparatus can neither reform nor maintain the moral high 
ground vis-à-vis a well-disciplined bureaucratic apparatus. 
Therefore, political reform should go hand in hand with re-
form of the civil service.
Turkey, on the other hand, demonstrates how things can 
go wrong when the political authority does have its way. 
From the 1980s onwards, the country’s relentless econo-
mic liberalisation efforts transformed what was in the late 
1970s a bankrupt national economy into one that genera-
ted impressive growth, albeit interrupted by periodic crises 
and instability. But with the exception of a brief era from 
the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, this wasn’t coupled with a 
comparable political liberalisation programme. When the 
chance for democratisation arrived at the turn of the mil-
lennium, the AKP government’s widely supported reforms 
to dismantle the military’s decades-long institutional tute-
lage gradually turned into an ideological vendetta against 
the bureaucracy and a pursuit to capture the state.
Together with weak labour laws, three decades of gradu-
al diffusion of private sector practices has arguably made 
the public sector more efficient and enabled Turkey to 
rise in ‘ease of doing business’ rankings and attract fo-
    31
reign praise and investment. At the same time, however, 
continued efforts by political actors to circumvent the 
centralised career system have undermined the merit 
principle and led to a surge in political patronage within 
the civil service. Patronage and corruption were noto-
rious features of Turkey’s state bureaucracy in the 1990s 
as well; although under weak coalition governments, 
established careers in the public service were able fend 
off political interference to preserve their integrity and 
remain as pockets of excellence. Under the AKP’s gradual 
dominance of politics and eventually the state, no public 
institution has remained untouched.
Whether it is allegations of systematic cheating by a gover-
nment-allied religious organisation in the 2010 Public Ser-
vice Selection Exam, the widespread use of oral interviews 
as a means to distribute posts to clients, or by-passing the 
formal recruitment procedures to replace thousands of 
purged civil servants with external appointees, it is safe to 
suggest that Turkey’s civil service is far from upholding its 
founding principles of merit and integrity today. 
This loss of integrity is deeply connected with Turkey’s dra-
matic democratic decline in recent years. Even more alar-
ming is the fact that this has come after an optimistic era 
of EU-led liberalisation and NPM-inspired reforms in the 
public service. Ironically, undermining civil service merito-
cracy has been frequently justified in the name of efficien-
cy or fighting bureaucratic tutelage. As Rizwi put it:69
A large part of the impetus for the reinvention of gover-
nment has come from developed countries with matu-
re democracies, and hence the existence of strong and 
established democratic institutions and processes has 
been taken for granted. […] Because the debate main-
ly focuses on efficiency, on the reduction of the cost 
of governance, and more generally on whittling down 
the all-embracing role of the government, not enough 
attention has been paid to strengthening democra-
cy – in fact the debate might have contributed to the 
weakening of democratic processes and especially de-
mocratic accountability.
69 Gowher Rizvi (2007), p. 78 
Reforming the civil service is treading a very fine line: ex-
cess privileges and powers wielded by civil servants can 
lead to a tutelary arrangement, while undue political 
interference in public administration undermines state 
capacity and rule of law. In both cases, the casualty is de-
mocratic process and accountability. Despite social, ins-
titutional and geopolitical differences between the two 
countries, Turkey’s experience has international relevance 
and should serve as a cautionary tale for Brazil.
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